

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #01934-84
26 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: [REDACTED]

25X1

National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]

25X1

National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT: Monthly Forecast and Warning Report -- USSR-EE

1. Prospects for US/Soviet Relations Thru 1984A. Discussion:

The main Soviet objectives through the rest of the year are likely to be 1) not to make any move -- particularly over INF -- that would either suggest that US policy is working or help the President's reelection prospects and 2) not to have the USSR appear as completely intransigent. These objectives are founded on the Soviet belief that the vagaries of US domestic politics preclude the basing of Soviet policy on the election prospects of any one candidate and render unlikely the reaching of any major arms control agreement before the election. Soviet actions therefore are likely to be primarily tactical in nature and designed to 1) keep all issues alive and put pressure on the US to demonstrate its sincerity by making concessions. 2) place greater emphasis than usual in blocking US moves in the Third World and publicizing any US frustrations there, albeit without running great risks themselves and 3) to influence the way in which US/Soviet issues are addressed in the US. The Soviets, for instance, are making additional funds available to Arbatov's publicists to travel to the US and engage in discussions with Americans. Some analysts, particularly from DIA, thought that the Soviets would play a more active role than this in trying to influence the US election; they

[REDACTED] 25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET

25X1

also thought that Chernenko would want to be permanently active to look like a statesmen. At the same time all analysts agreed that Soviet leadership politics would not seriously handicap the Soviets since their game was mainly tactical and could be left for the tacticians (such as Gromyko, Zamyatin, Zagladin, etc.) to handle.

25X1

2. Soviet Policy in Afghanistan:

A. Discussion:

No great change in Soviet military policy seems in the offing. On the one hand, the Soviet are making slight adjustments in their order of battle in Afghanistan -- including a slight increase in troop strength -- and are probably planning a very active spring campaign, albeit along the same lines as previous campaigns. On the other hand, they seem increasingly upset at not yet having solved self-generated problems that have hampered their operations, such as neglect of hygiene, poor maintenance, poor discipline, irresponsible conduct by some officers, and lack of surprise during operations. They will probably concentrate on alleviating these problems rather than increase their troop strength significantly or devise new and more aggressive combat tactics. It is possible, however, that they will break the cease fire in the Panjsher valley as well as give greater leeway to Afghan units to stray across the Pakistan border in hot pursuit operations.

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied